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Political  Parties 
in  the  European  Community 
The political parties of the Six European Community countries have enough in 
common to justify a joint study of them. In the first  place, the six countries form an 
area  united  by several  factors-a roughly  equal  level  of economic  development, 
important common experiences in recent history, and the influence of certain basic 
philosophical ideas such as Christianity and liberal democracy, so that the  political 
life of each of the Six tends to be,  at least to some extent, similar. 
Secondly,  the  experience  of co-operat;'on  within  the  political  and  economic 
structures  created  by the  Six  in  the  last  twenty  years-the European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community,  Euratom,  and  the  European  Economic  Community,  with  the 
parliamentary assembly set up to control their work *-has led to close links between 
the  political parties themselves.  Thus the frequent  meetings between the Socialists 
or the Christian Democrats of the Six mean that they often feel  they have more in 
common  with  each  other  than  with  political  parties  of the  same  persuasion  in 
countries outside the Six-and sometimes more than with rival parties within their 
own countries. 
The political  parties  of the  Six  may  be  seen  as 
representatives  of  four  basic  strands  of  political 
thought:  Socialism,  Communism,  Christian  Democ-
racy,  and Gaullism.  This list,  like  any  other,  is  of 
course  open  to  question.  Gaullism,  for  instance,  is 
naturally an almost exclusively French phenomenon, 
and has  been much more important during the ten 
years of the Fifth Republic (1958-1968)  than during 
the  twelve  years  of  the  Fourth (1946-1958).  Chris-
tian  Democracy,  again,  is  a  political  creed  which 
now appears less  influential than it did  a few  years 
ago:  the role of its official spokesmen in France has 
greatly  diminished,  while  the  Christian  Democrat 
parties  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  elsewhere  are  now 
forced  to  share political power with the representa-
tives of Socialism. The above list makes no mention 
of  Liberalism,  although  Liberal  or Radical  politi-
cians have on the whole been more influential within 
the Six (especially in France and Belgium) than they 
have  in  Great  Britain,  and  the  Liberal  Group  in 
the  European Parliament is  fairly  strong.  Nor does 
it conclude the various branches of right-wing poli-
tical  thought  represented  by  the  Monarchists  in 
Italy,  or by the  National Democratic Party (NPD) 
in  Germany. 
The-Socialists 
It may  be  helpful  to  start  our  survey  with  the 
political  parties  representing  Socialism,  partly 
because  this  'political  family'  was  the  first  to  give 
rise  to  organised  parties,  and  partly  because  the 
other  'political  families',  in  varying  degrees,  came 
into existence as  reactions against it. 
The political  parties  representing  Western  Euro-
pean  Socialism-sometimes bearing the  formal  title 
of 'Social Democratic Party' and led by such men as 
* See  forthcoming  European  Studies  No.  3  "The  European  Parliament". 
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Willy  Brandt  in  West  Germany,  Guy  Mollet  and 
Franc;ois  Mitterrand in France, and  (until  recently) 
Paul-Henri Spaak in Belgium-have a good deal in 
common  with  the  British  Labour  Party.  Like  the 
Labour Party, they originally grew out of the social 
conditions  of  the  nineteenth-century  Industrial 
Revolution, and out of the conviction that the capi-
talist  order  of  society  was  economically  inefficient 
and morally indefensible, and should be replaced by 
a  new  order based  on  the  principles  of  Socialism. 
The most  important difference  between  the  British 
Labour Party  and most  of  its  continental counter-
parts  was  that  the  latter  were  all  influenced  in 
varying degrees  by  the  theories  of Karl Marx. This 
means  that  whereas  the  British  Labour  Party,  in 
becoming  basically  a  reformist  party,  has  simply 
ignored Clause Four of its constitution (committing 
the party to  the  public  ownership  of the means  of 
production),  the  continental  socialist  parties  have 
fought  long  battles over whether they should revise 
or  retain  their  commitment  to  several  aspects  of 
the political and philosophical doctrine of Marxism. 
For instance, the French Socialist Party immediately 
after the Liberation refused to make common cause 
with  left-wing  Catholics,  on  the  grounds  that  the 
Catholic Church could never be a respectable ally for 
a progressive party; while in West Germany the Social 
Democratic  Party's  adoption  of  a  reformist  pro-
gramme at its conference in Bad Godesberg in 1959 
represented a fairly dramatic break with a tradition 
of  Marxist  party  programmes  going  back  almost 
a century. 
The Socialist  parties  of the Six  normally get  be-
tween  25  and 40  per cent of the votes  at elections. 
They  normally  draw  main  voting  strength  from 
industrial workers (in  Germany from  the great bulk 
of  the  working  class,  in  France  and  Italy-where 
there is  more serious competition from  the Commu-
nists-from skilled  and white-collar workers).  They are  correspondingly  represented  in  the Parliaments 
of the six capitals. 
Unlike  the  British  Labour  Party  or  the  Social 
Democratic Parties  of Scandinavia, Socialist parties 
within  the  Six  have  never  been  strong  enough  to 
hold  power  alone,  but they  have  repeatedly  taken 
a large share of the power in coalition Governments. 
- In  France,  they  held  office  with  Christian 
Democrats and Communists in the immediate  post-
war period, and later in a series of centre coalitions, 
sometimes  under  Socialist  leadership. 
- In Italy, they have joined in various coalitions, 
in which the Socialist influence has been particularly 
strong in the last four years. 
- In West Germany-though here the Socialists 
have really made their greatest mark in local govern-
ment-they  have  joined  in  the  'Grand  Coalition' 
which has governed  the Federal Republic  since  the 
end of 1966, in which the party leader Willy Brandt 
is  Vice-Chancellor  and  Foreign  Minister. 
In  terms  of  policy,  the  Socialist  spokesmen  in 
these coalitions, and the Socialist parties in times of 
opposition,  have stood  for  the  traditional  demands 
of  the  left.  This  has  meant,  to  some  extent,  the 
public  ownership  of  industry  (which  has  been  put 
into  effect  for  the  basic  industries  of  most  of  the 
six countries, in many cases at about the time when 
the  post-war  Labour  Government  was  carrying  it 
out in Britain). It has meant policies of social secu-
rity and  social  progress,  such  as  Health Insurance, 
old-age  benefits,  and-particularly in France-legal 
guarantees  of equal  pay for  women  and of  several 
weeks' paid holiday every year for all workers. And 
it has  meant generally,  a  redistribution  of  income 
in favour of the worse-off sections of the community. 
Even  though  they  have  never  held  power  alone, 
the  Socialist  parties  of  the  Six  have  been  fairly 
successful  in  persuading  their coalition  partners  to 
accept and act on these policies. 
The Communists 
The Communist parties  of  Western  Europe, like 
the strong influence of Marxism, represent an aspect 
of  the  continental Left which  distinguishes  it from 
the  left  wing  in  Britain.  Whereas  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution of  1917  had only a marginal impact on 
the  British Labour movement-splitting away  only 
a  limited  fraction  of  the  left  of  the  Labour Party 
and  of other left-wing  groups  to form  the  Commu-
nist  Party  of  Great Britain-the situation  in  most 
continental  countries  was  different.  Partly  because 
of a strong tradition of Marxism, combined with the 
profoundly  unsettling  effects  of  the  First  World 
War, quite substantial sections of the pre-1924 Social 
Democratic Parties broke away under the impact of 
Lenin to  form  separate Communist parties. 
In the Federal  Republic  of Germany,  it is  true, 
the  present-day  influence  of  Communism  is  very 
slight.  Although the  German Communist Party was 
the  strongest,  outside  Russia,  in  the  Communist 
International  of  the  1920's,  it was  destroyed  as  an 
organization  by Hitler  (many  of  its  leaders  fled  to 
Russia and were later liquidated in Stalin's purges), 
and its popularity in West Germany has been reduc-
ed  to  vanishing-point by  the nature of  the  Russian 
occupation after the war and of the Russian-imposed 
Communist  regime  in  East  Germany.  Precisely 
because the Communists in Federal Republic stand 
little  chance  in  free  elections,  it  has  been  widely 
argued that the legal decision of the German Federal 
court in 1956, declaring the Communist Party illegal, 
was  politically  unwise,  and  should  be  reversed.  In 
September  1968  a  new  Communist  Party  was  in 
fact set up in West Germany, and because it declares 
its  acceptance  of  the  constitution,  will  apparently 
not this time be banned. 
Outside the  German  Federal  Republic,  however, 
the  influence  of  Communism  remains  stronger.  In 
France  and  Italy,  in particular, Communist Parties 
have succeeded in winning between one quarter and 
one third of the votes  at most of the post-war elec-
tions,  and  as  it has  been  difficult for  other  parties 
of the Left to combine with them,  this  has  resulted 
in  a  permanent  shifting  of  the  balance  of  political 
power to the Right. In France, it is true, the Commu-
nists  participated  in  government  (part  of  the  time 
under de  Gaulle)  in the immediate  post-war  years, 
but  since  then  they  have  restricted  their  role  to 
becoming a pressure group for the interests  of their 
voters-and  also  for  their  large-scale  trade-union 
membership-on the extreme left. 
It is  no  longer  strictly  true  to  call  the  Western 
European  Communist  Parties  'revolutionary':  this 
was confirmed in May 1968  by the remarkably anti-
revolutionary  attitude  of  the  French  Communist 
Party  and-perhaps  more  significant  in  the  long 
run-these Communist Parties  have  in  recent years 
taken an increasingly positive attitude towards Euro-
pean integration as represented by the EEC. Having 
denounced  European integration in  the  1950's  as  a 
capitalist plot to attack  the living  standards  of the 
working  class,  the  Communist Parties of Italy  and 
France have come, since the beginning of the 1960's, 
to  accept that integration can make positive contri-
butions  to  economic  and social  development.  They 
have  therefore  sought  representation  in  the  Euro-
pean Parliament as  a way of influencing this devel-
opment,  and  their  trade  union  organizations  have 
sought representation in the Community's Economic 
and Social Council. 
The  appeal  of Communism  in  France and  Italy 
remains strong-partly for traditional reasons, since 
these  parties represent a genuine tradition of 'revo-
lution'  -but in  terms  of their actual  policies  there 
are increasingly good prospects of integrating them, 
in the not too distant future. into the political life of 
Europe. 
The Christian  Democrats 
If Communism  may  be  described  as  a  reaction 
from  the  Left against Democratic Socialism,  Chris-
tian  Democracy  may  not  unfairly  be  called  an ELECTIONS IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
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last  twenty  years,  the Christian Democratic  parties 
of  the  Six-the parties  led  by  Adenauer,  Erhard, 
and Kiesinger in West Germany, by De Gasperi and 
Moro in Italy, and by Georges Bidault, Robert Schu-
man and Jean Lecanuet in France-have taken up 
positions somewhat to the right of the  Socialists  on 
most  political  issues. 
In  Germany,  Adenauer  and  his  successors  have 
stood  very  firmly  for  the  principles  of  free  enter-
prise  against  state  control  of  industry,  and  they 
strongly  supported  the  re-armament  of  West  Ger-
many, in alliance with the United States and NATO, 
at  a  time  when  the  Socialist  opposition  radically 
opposed these policies. 
In Italy, again,  the Christian Democrat Party has 
not been  strong in  support of  state  intervention  to 
redress  the  economic  balance between  the  prosper-
ous north of Italy and the backward south. 
In  France,  the  Christian  Democrat  Party  (  offi-
cially  entitled  MRP  or  Mouvement  Republicain 
Populaire)  was  closely associated in  the  late  1940's 
and most of the  1950's  with France's colonial wars 
in  Indo-China  and  Algeria. 
The  picture  of  Christian  Democracy  as  a  right-
wing  force,  however,  is  only  part of the  story.  The 
Christian  Democratic  Parties  of  Western  Europe, 
when  they  were  founded  after  the  Second  World 
War, represented a political force which was in many 
ways  a  new  one,  and its  newness  included  a genu-
inely progressive outlook on  many problems. In the 
first  place,  it was  on  the whole  something  new  for 
the  Catholic  Church  to  be  directly  represented  in 
Europe's  political  life.  In France,  the  Church  had 
been  regarded  since  the  18th  century  as  a  socially 
and  politically  reactionary  force,  and  had  been 
deliberately  excluded  from  the  public  life  of  the 
militantly anti-clerical Third Republic (particularly, 
for instance, from  any influence over the state edu-
cational  system).  In Italy,  the  modern  nation-state, 
the  Kingdom  of Italy created  in  the  mid-19th cen-
tury,  had  come  into  being  at  the  expense  of  the 
Papacy,  whose  political  and  territorial  authority  it 
had  taken  away,  and  the  Liberal  monarchist  poli-
ticians  of  the early  20th century had been  replaced 
by  the  dictator  Mussolini,  who  was  even  more 
opposed  to  the  political  power of the Church  than 
they were. In Germany, again, although the Catholic 
Centre  Party  had  been  established  in  the  time  of 
Bismark,  it  had  played  the  role-both  under  the 
'Iron  Chancellor'  and  under  the  various  regimes 
which  had  followed-of a  pressure group with  the 
very  limited  aim  of  protecting  Catholic  interests, 
and  very  little  ambition  to  influence  the  general 
direction of politics. 
The  Second  World  War  shattered  the  existing 
political  structures  of Europe,  and  also  discredited 
the political forces which had dominated them. This 
allowed  the  politically-minded  elements  in  the 
Catholic Church to  come  to  the  force. 
In the political void of 1945,  these representatives 
of politically progressive Catholicism came forward, 
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and  the  programmes  of  the  new  Christian  Demo-
cratic parties reflect their conviction that the politi-
cal parties of the future must be committed to social 
and  economic  reform.  The  original  programme  of 
the  German  Christian  Democratic  Union  had  a 
distinctly  socialistic  flavour-in  Germany,  as  else-
where,  leaders  of  the  Christian  trade  union  move-
ment  were  actively  involved-and  in  France  and 
Italy,  too,  the new  programmes  sounded  a  note  of 
social  progress.  It was  probably  in  France,  where 
the  MRP  held  power  jointly  with  Socialists  and 
Communists until  1947,  that this left-wing influence 
went  furthest:  here,  basic  industries  were  national-
ized and the foundations of a well-developed welfare 
state were laid at this time. 
In  Germany  and  in  Italy,  where  Socialism  and 
state  intervention  in  economics  had  been  made 
highly  suspect  by  the  excesses  of  the  Fascist  and 
National Socialist dictatorships, the Christian Demo-
cratic  parties  were  quite  soon  dominated  by  their 
more  conservative  (or,  in economic  terms,  liberal) 
wings.  The  Christian  trade  unionists  of  the  Left 
were  reduced  to  the  status  of  a  pressure  group 
working  within  basically conservative  parties.  Even 
in  France,  when  the  post-war  left-wing  coalition 
fell  apart, and the political centre of gravity  shifted 
back towards  the right, Christian Democrats  found 
themselves  working  in  coalition  governments  of  a 
more right-wing complexion. Indeed, some of them, 
for  instance  Maurice  Schumann  (no  relation  to 
Robert Schuman)  have now  moved  even  further to 
the right, by becoming avowed "Gaullists". 
The greatest contribution of Christian Democracy 
to the political life of post-war Europe will probably 
be seen by future historians as  lying in their cham-
pionship of the ideal  of European unity.  As  repre-
sentatives  of  essentially  international  Catholic 
Church, Christian  Democrats  had only  a  relatively 
limited  loyalty  to  the  existing  nation-states  of 
Western Europe. Thus all the  new  post-war consti-
tutions of these states, strongly influenced by Chris-
tian  Democratic  thinking,  made  provision  for  the 
handing over of sovereignty to  some future United 
States  of  Europe.  The names  of Adenauer,  Robert 
Schuman, and De Gasperi, the Christian Democratic 
leaders  of the  early  1950's,  will  always  be  remem-
bered,  since  without  their  initiative  the  institutions 
of  the  European  Community,  from  the  Schuman 
Plan to the Common Market, would almost certainly 
not have come into being. 
The ••Gaullists'' 
"Gaullism", the  third challenge to Socialism, has 
come  on  the  scene  more  recently,  and  in  a  more 
limited  area,  than  either  Communism  or Christian 
Democracy.  Its beginning can be  dated from  1946, 
when General de Gaulle resigned as head of govern-ment in the French Fourth Republic,  and began to 
issue his series of challenges to the Republic and to 
its  policies.  Geographically,  Gaullism  can  hardly 
be  said  to  exist  as  a  political  force  outside  the 
boundaries  of  France.  However,  the  impact  of 
Gaullism on the political life of western Europe has 
been  so  strong,  particularly  in  the  ten  years  since 
de Gaulle replaced the Fourth Republic by the Fifth, 
that it can hardly be  ignored  in  any  survey  of  the 
political parties of Europe today. 
De Gaulle's basic objection to  the Fourth Repub-
lic and its institutions, as  these took shape in  1945-
1946,  was  that  they  resembled  all  too  closely  the 
institutions  of  the  Third  Republic.  This  meant  a 
regime  in  which  over-weak  governments  were  per-
petually at the mercy of an over-strong parliament-
ary  assembly,  which  in  de  Gaulle's  view  had  been 
a  main  cause  of  the  weakness  of  French  govern-
ments  in  the  1930's  and of the humiliating collapse 
of 1940. De Gaulle's declarations from 1946 onwards, 
and the programme of the RPF (Rassemblement du 
peuple tran9ais)  which he founded in 1947,  stressed 
the  need  for  France to  have  a  strong executive,  to 
a  large  extent  independent  of  the  pressures  from 
parliament,  so  that  national  policy-particularly 
diplomacy  and military strategy-could be  pursued 
in a consistent and long-term way. 
The RPF, which was  essentially  a  rallying  point 
for  the  personal  admirers  of  the  General,  scored  a 
considerable success  in  the local  elections  of  1948, 
and  in  the  French  parliamentary  election  of  1951 
it  made  a  surprising  gain  which  gave  it  one-sixth 
of  the  seats  in  the Assembly.  (It should,  according 
to  proportional representation, have been a quarter, 
but the electoral system adopted constituted a hand-
icap  to  both  Gaullists  and  Communists). 
Despite  a  slight  electoral  set-back  in  1955,  and 
a  series  of  splits within the movement,  the Gaullist 
party-or more  exactly  the  General  himself-was 
in  a  strong  enough  position  in  May  1958  to  seize 
power  from  the  faltering  grasp  of the  Fourth Re-
public, in the  crisis  brought about by the Algerian 
War.  In various elections  held  under the  Fifth Re-
public,  in  1958,  1962,  1967,  and  1968,  the  Gaullist 
party,  under  a  variety  of  names-Union  pour  la 
nouvelle Republique (UNR), Union  des Democrates 
pour  Ia  Republique  (UDR)-has  won  majorities 
varying  from  slight  to  massive,  and  has  totally 
altered  the traditional balance  of political forces  in 
France. 
The  Gaullist  party is  still  very  much  influenced 
-as  the RPF was throughout its history-by motives 
of personal loyalty to  General de Gaulle. Under its 
parliamentary leaders, however, particularly Georges 
Pompidou,  the  party  has  recently  moved  towards 
adopting  a  more  coherent  and  explicit  series  of 
policy objectives-even though these remain closely 
related  to  the  personal  objectives  of  President 
de  Gaulle.  Gaullism,  as  a  doctrine,  stands  for  the 
strengthening of the executive  and the  strict limita-
tion  of the  powers  of  parliament.  It stands  for  a 
considerable degree of state intervention in economic 
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life,  for  instance  in  bringing  about the  'de-concen-
tration' of industrial activity away from Paris to  the 
other  regions.  Above  all,  it  stands  for  a  foreign 
policy based on the principles of national independ-
ence,  national  self-sufficiency  in  defence  matters 
(hence  the  national  nuclear  deterrent),  and  a  strict 
limitation of the powers of supranational institutions 
such  as  those  of the  European Economic Commu-
nity. 
The  elections  of  1967  and  1968  in  France  have 
shown  that  these  doctrines  have  a  considerable 
appeal-partly,  it  is  true,  because  the  opposition 
parties  remain  so  extremely  divided-and  in  one 
form or another the ideas of Gaullism will certainly 
remain strong in France, whether or not the Gaullist 
party as such remains united after the General him-
self has gone. 
Outside  France,  as  mentioned  above,  the  appeal 
of  Gaullism  has  naturally  been  limited.  It is  true 
that  Chancellor  Adenauer  in  the  late  1950's  was 
strongly in  sympathy with de Gaulle's views on how 
a  political  regime  should  be  run,  and  in  1959  he 
considered  taking  on  the  role  of  Federal President 
in West Germany and turning it into something like 
the  Gaullist  Presidency  of  France.  It is  also  true 
that some  of  the leading members  of the  Christian 
Democratic  Party  in  Germany-notably  Franz-
Josef  Strauss-have been  so  attracted  by  some  of 
de  Gaulle's  ideas  on  foreign  policy  that  they  have 
acquired  the  label  of  'German  Gaullists'.  But  the 
underlying differences between these views and those 
of  the  General  himself-particularly  on  East-West 
relations  in  Europe-are  so  substantial  that  the 
label is  misleading, and Gaullism in any real sense 
stands  very  little chance  of winning  much  support 
in  Germany.  The  importance  of  Gaullism  lies  in 
what  it  does  within  France,  and  in  the  impact  of 
Gaullist France on a basically non-Gaullist Europe. 
Conclusion 
The political parties  of Western Europe are in  a 
state of  change  and confusion,  and it may  be  that 
Liberal and Conservative parties, hardly considered 
here in this  article, will make something of a come-
back. Some of the Liberal Parties of the Six, indeed, 
have  already  made  a  remarkable  revival  in  recent 
years.  This  is  particularly  true  of  Belgium,  where 
the  vigorous  leadership  of  Orner  Vanaudenhove 
contributed  to  striking  election  successes  in  1965 
and 1968. In Germany, too, the Liberal FDP's posi-
tion  of  opposition  to  the  Grand  Coalition  has 
brought  it  new  strength,  including  such  prominent 
new  supporters  as  the  sociologist  Professor  Ralf 
Dahrendorf. Despite this, however, the main political 
battles in the coming years appear almost certain to 
be  fought  between  :the  forces  of  the  'big  four' 
-Socialism, Communism, Christian Democracy and 
Gaullism. European Studies, 2,  1968 
The  Flhine  and  the  EEC 
For nations which all too often have been enemies,  the Rhine was a frontier. 
But for traders and manufacturers-for the economies of the Rhineland countries-
the river is far  less a boundary between Germany and France  than a link between 
the  heartland  of Europe  and  the  North  Sea.  Despite  the  Rhine's  international 
status, these  two characteristics,  pulling in opposite directions,  have long  impeded 
the exploitation of its full economic potential. The creation of the EEC opened up 
favourable  prospects  for  the  development of the  Rhine and  its associated  water-
ways, and for the industrial centres of the new Community which focus upon them. 
l.j Infrastructures 
Some  physical  features 
The  Rhine  is  828  miles  long.  In  Europe,  the 
Volga, Danube, Dnieper, Don, Vistula and Dniester 
are longer;  on a world scale, the Nile, Amazon and 
Mississipi  are all  more than four  times  longer than 
the Rhine. 
The  flow  of  the  Rhine  is  both  abundant  and 
regular.  From  the  source  to  Coblenz  the  Rhine 
flows  through  an  Alpine  climatic  region  charact-
erised by  summ<~r rainfall;  from Coblenz to  the sea 
an oceanic climatic region brings a winter maximum 
of rainfall.  The regularity  of flow  makes  the Rhine 
a reliable river for navigation and for the production 
of hydro-electric power. 
Infrequently,  floods  or low  water  interrupt  navi-
gation.  In  the  summer  of  1964  the  shallowness 
reduced the possible draught for vessels. The severe 
winter of  1962-1963  resulted in  freezing  of parts of 
the  Rhine;  by  and  large,  it  is  estimated  that  ice 
blocks  the  Rhine  for  nearly  one  month  in  one 
winter in five. 
River control for navigation 
The conversion of the Rhine from  a natural river 
to an artificial waterway has been achieved since the 
middle  of  the  ltlineteenth  century;  this  regulation 
was stimulated by the industrial growth of the Ruhr 
with  the  requirement  for  cheap  transport  of  bulk 
commodities. 
The Delta 
The  deltaic  conditions  of  the  lower  Rhine  have 
compelled the Netherlands to  fix  the courses  of the 
two  main  distributaries-the Lek  and  the  Waal-
and  the  links  between  them  and  the  Meuse.  The 
intricate  system  of  streams  (including  the  Noord, 
Merwede,  Nieuwe  Maas,  Oude  Maas,  Hollandse 
Diep  and Haringvliet)  will  be directed  towards  the 
new  waterway, the artificial channel linking Rotter-
dam to  the sea. This is  the only navigable maritime 
waterway in the delta plan network. 
Further  to  the  south  the  sea  link  for  Antwerp, 
the  Westerschelde,  remains  open.  Between  the 
Westerschelde  and  the  new  waterway  a  line  of 
dykes is  under construction. The background to  this 
delta  plan  is  the  disastrous  tidal  wave  of  Febru-
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ary 1st 1953, in which 1,843  died and 72,000 people 
were  evacuated. 
Seventeen gigantic locks  are the 'safety valves' in 
the  system;  these  remain  closed  except  when  the 
Rhine  is  in  flood.  The  lock-gates  obstruct  excep-
tional  rises  of  the  tides  which  would  otherwise 
threaten  the  low-lying  polder regions  of  the  Rand-
stad  between  Rotterdam,  Utrecht,  Amsterdam  and 
The Hague. 
The Rhine-Meuse network is linked through inter-
mediary  waterways  with  the  Scheidt  network.  On 
completion  of  the  Delta  Plan,  with  the  closure  of 
the sea inlets and the separation of the various fresh 
water  basins  in  Zealand,  Antwerp  will  retain  a 
means  of  access  to  the Rhine for  vessels  of  up  to 
2,000  tons,  in  the  form  of  a  new  canal  passing 
through  Bergen-op-Zoom  and  Willemstad. 
The Rhine Massif area 
The  successful  control  of  the  lower  Rhine  for 
navigation contrasts with the unsatisfactory channel 
in the  Rhine Massif.  The Lorelei Gap is  navigated 
via two narrow channels which create traffic conges-
tion,  and  pilots  are  required  here.  Work  is  in 
progress  to  deepen  the  navigable  channel  between 
St.  Goar and Mannheim. 
The Middle Rhine 
The  river  between  Mainz  and  Basle  has  not yet 
been  completely  controlled;  diversion  reaches  still 
have  to  be  constructed  from  Strasbourg  onwards. 
The Upper Rhine 
River  control  in  this  section  has  been  impeded 
by  natural obstacles, especially  torrents  and  water-
falls.  A  plan  has  been  drawn  up  and  adopted  to 
regulate the river between Basle and Constance. The 
falls  at Schaffhausen are a particular problem. 
The tributaries 
Nineteenth-century history  dictated  that the  east-
ern tributaries,  in  Germany,  would  be  most  devel-
oped for navigation. In recent times, the division  of 
Germany  has  resulted  in  the  amputation  of  water-
ways  and,  on  the  West  bank,  improvements  have 
been made. 
The East Bank Waterways 
The canalisation of the Main was  taken as  far  as 
Bamberg  in  1961  and  construction  works  are  in progress  to  complete  the  Rhine-Main-Danube  link 
on the Bamberg-Nuremberg section. 
The canalisation  of  the  N eckar reached  Stuttgart 
in  1958,  and  this  has  led  to  the  integration  of  the 
industrial economies of Baden-Wurttemberg and the 
Rhineland. 
Running  east  from  the  Rhine  are  canals  which 
link  the  Ruhr industrial  area  with  the  North  Sea 
ports  of  Emden,  Bremen  and  Hambourg,  via  the 
navigable rivers  Ems, Weser and Elbe, and the city 
of Berlin. 
To avoid a longer voyage and the shallow draught 
course  of  the  Elbe  a  junction  canal  between  the 
Elbe near Hambourg and the Mittelland Canal east 
of Hanover is  being excavated. 
In  1953  work  was  completed  on  a  canal  in  the 
Netherlands  joining  the  Rhine  to  Amsterdam  and 
from  there  the  North  Sea  Canal  enters  the  sea  at 
ljmuiden. 
The West Bank Waterways 
The Rhone-Rhine Canal and Marne-Rhine Canal 
are  small  and  unsuitable  for  present  requirements. 
In  1963  the  canalisation  of  the  Moselle  was  com-
pleted between Thionville and the Rhine at Coblenz. 
This canal connects  the  industrial area of Lorraine 
with the Ruhr and  the North Sea. 
The  Juliana  canal,  completed  in  1953,  connects 
the  Meuse  and  the  Sambre-Meuse  steel  area  with 
the Rhine now that the out-dated Lanaye lock below 
Liege  (known  as  the  'Lanaye  Bottleneck'),  which 
could only take vessels of 600 tons capacity between 
two  waterways  of  2,000  tons  capacity,  has  been 
replaced  by  modern  installations. 
As  the  Meuse is  now  regulated for  vessels  up  to 
the  1, 350  tons  class  from  the  French  frontier  at 
Givet,  it forms  an  excellent  Rhine  link  via  Venlo 
and Nijmegen. Several plans for linking Liege-Maas-
tricht  to  the  Ruhr have  been  suggested.  It  seems 
that attention is being devoted to the route from Born 
(near  Sittard)  to  Neuss  (opposite  Dusseldorf)  with 
a  branch  to  the  Aix-la-Chapelle-Heerlen  industrial 
area. 
Apart from  the  Moselle,  the  Rhine's  links  with 
France are poor. The French Meuse can only  take 
barges up  to  250 tons and shallow reaches  on other 
rivers  and  canals  prohibit  links  with  the  Paris 
region,  .  southern  France  and  the  north-east  of 
France. 
II. Traffic on-the Rhine 
From the North Sea  to Basle, barges carrying up 
to  2,000  tons  of goods  can navigate  on  the  Rhine; 
the main links can take 1,350-ton vessels  of the so-
called  European class,  which  require  a  draught  of 
2.5  metres.  Nevertheless  low  water  levels  make  it 
necessary to reduce the load carried by the vessels. 
On  certain  sections,  upstream  navigation  of  the 
Rhine  requires  great  tractive  forces;  one  hp  is 
enough  to carry 6 tons  up  from  Rotterdam  to  the 
Ruhr but is only enough to take 2 tons through the 
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Rhine massif and 1.5 tons along the Canal d'  Alsace. 
This  explains  the  specialisation  of  vessels  on  the 
various  sections  of  the  Rhine: 
- on the lower Rhine chiefly  trains of 2,000-ton 
barges  ply,  and  these  are  towed  by  low-powered 
tugs  of 500  hp. 
- on the Middle Rhine ply chiefly self-propelled 
barges  or trains  of  barges  towed  by  high-powered 
tugs  of 4,000 hp. 
The  increase  in  the  number  of  self-propelled 
barges  and  the  introduction,  in  1957,  of  a  system 
of  push-barges  (as  used  on  the  American  Great 
Lakes)  are recent developments. 
The commercial structure of the  Rhine transport 
system is  extremely varied;  individual owners  oper-
ating their barges themselves are in the majority and 
this has  often checked modernisation of equipment, 
as  bargemen  are  never  certain  of  immediately 
finding  cargoes  where  they  happen  to  be;  they  are 
reluctant to renew  equipment that is  not always  in 
full use. 
Three  quarters  of  the  Dutch  and  French  fleets 
consist on small units  operated by their owners. On 
the  other  hand,  two  thirds  of  the  German  fleet 
belong to  large shipping concerns which themselves 
are owned by Ruhr industrial compagnies. The size 
of vessels  on  the  German Rhine is  directly  related 
to  the ownership pattern. 
The deadweight capacities of the different national 
fleets  are assessed  in million tons  at: 
Netherlands  5.2  (potential Rhine fleet) 
Germany  1.9  (fleet based on  the Rhine basin, 
excluding Main and Neckar) 
Belgium 
France 
2.2  (total  for  national fleet) 
350,000  (fleet  based  on  the  Rhine 
basin) 
Switzerland  465,000. 
Rhine trade 
The total Rhine trade comprises  all goods  which 
have  been  transported  between  Rotterdam  and 
Basle-Rheinfelden. If the  trade which  is  carried on 
only on the Dutch section of the Rhine is  deducted, 
this  gives  the  traditional  Rhine trade,  which  alone 
was recorded before 1938, and thus comprises all the 
trade  upstream  from  the  frontier  and  all  the  trade 
across  this  frontier in either direction. 
Total Rhine trade 1965  .  .  .  .  .  223  m. t. 
•  Trade  solely  on  the  Dutch  section 
- trade  between  Dutch  ports  via 
the  Rhine  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
- trade  between  Dutch  ports  and 
Belgian  or French ports via  the 
Rhine  .  .  .  .  . 
72.3  m. t. 
56.3  m. t. 
15.7  m. t. 
- mixed  trade  0.3  m. t. 
•  Traditional  Rhine  trade  151  m. t. 
This  is  now  expanding  very  rapidly  compared 
with  1947  though as  the table shows this expansion 
is far from regular. THE  RHINE  AND  ITS 
WATERWAY  SYSTEM 
Rivers navigable by ships  up to 3,000 tons 
Canals  navigable by ships  up to 3,000 tons 
Rivers navigable by ships up to  1,350 tons 
Canals  navigable by ships  up to  1,350 tons 
Other rivers 
Other canals 
Under construction 
Projected 
0  50  100M 
oE====c===5sEo==~====1~60km TABLE 1.  - Development of Rhine trade 
in millions of tons 
Total  Traditional  Trans- Total 
Frontier  down- up  Year  Rhine  Rhine  trade  stream  stream  Trade  Trade  (Lobith)  %  % 
1938  113  90  56  49.8  50.2 
1947  40  20  8  57.7  42.3 
1948  61  37  16  61.1  38.9 
1949  70  43  21  61.9  38.1 
1950  88  56  28  60.3  39.7 
1955  137  95  50  35.6  64.4 
1960  186  133  71  34.7  65.3 
1961  189  133  69  36.5  63.5 
1962  188  130  67  34.9  65.1 
1963  187  132  67  34.1  65.9 
1964  208  140  73  33.1  66.9 
1965  223  151  81  34.8  65.2 
The figures in the table reflect the effects of politi-
cal,  economic and physical conditions. 
Variations of small magnitude were  the result of 
periods  of  low  water,  a  very  cold  winter  and  a 
poorer  economic  situation.  Thus  1960  was  an  ex-
cellent  year  compared  with  1962.  Variations  of 
greater magnitude are the result of serious economic 
crises and war. Thus trade on the Rhine was almost 
non-existent in 1945. 
Changes in the distribution of trade flows 
The importance  of  the  international  role  played 
by the Rhine has increased less rapidly than that of 
its  national  role,  i.e.  trade  on  the  Dutch  section 
only or on the German and frontier section between 
Basle  and  Lobith.  The  weakening  of  this  inter-
national trade is  attributed to: 
- reduced exports of coal 
- the replacement of European exports of heavy 
products  by  light  but  extremely  valuable  finished 
products 
- the  increasingly  large-scale  conveyance  of 
petroleum through  pipelines.  There are three  pipe-
lines,  soon  to  be  followed  by  a  fourth,  supplying 
crude oil to refineries  which are functioning on the 
Middle Rhine 
- instead of long-distance transport of crude oil, 
transport of refined  petroleum products is  develop-
ing on the Rhine over short distances  between  the 
refineries and the consumption centres: international 
trade, i.e.  that across  the Dutch frontier, now con-
stitutes  no  more  than  half  the  traditional  Rhine 
trade,  whereas  before  the war it accounted  for  60 
to 70  %. 
Changes in the types of goods carried 
The Rhine  used  to  be  a  great coal-trading  river 
but now this  trade is  in decline: 
- because European exports have ceased; 
- because the developement of the steel industry 
near to the North Sea, e.g.  at Dunkirk, Rotterdam, 
ljmuiden, and  downstream from  Ghent,  has  led  to 
the import of coal, chiefly from the USA; 
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- because,  since  1957,  the  Community's  policy 
has  taken  account  of  the  difficulties  of  the  coal-
mining  areas  and  has  aimed  at promoting  the  use 
of  other  sources  of  energy,  such  as  oil,  gas,  and 
atomic power. 
The  Rhine  has  become  an  'oil'  and,  above  all, 
an 'ore' river as  it receives  ever-increasing amounts 
of iron ore from distant ports, in Mauritania, Brazil 
and Labrador. 
The transport of cereals, foodstuffs  and chemical 
products is also increasing in connection with chang-
ing  food  requirements  and  the  diversification  of 
industries in the Rhine Valley. 
Upstream and downstream trade flows 
Before  the  war  the  upstream  shipment  of  ore, 
foodstuffs  and petroleum products was smaller than 
the  downstream  shipment  of  coal  and  steel  and 
chemical products. 
Since the war the upstream traffic has become the 
more important of the two and this is clearly evident 
in the figures  on this  table. 
TABLE  2.  - Trans-frontier  trade  by  product  groups 
at Emmerich in millions of tons 
Upstream  Downstream 
1966  1967  1966  1967 
Grains  3.0  3.5  Coal  5.3  7.8 
Iron ore  17.4  18.5  Sand, gravel  13.9  16.5 
3.5  Stones, earth  2.0  2.4 
Scrap metal  3.1  3.8  Cement  0.6  0.7 
Coal  3.8  10.9  Fertilizer  2.9  3.1 
Oil  10.5  0.7  Steel and 
Timber  0.8  steel products  5.2  7.6 
Others  14.2  13.9  Others  5.3  6.4  --
52.8  54.8  35.2  44.5 
It can  be  seen  that  raw  materials  and  energy 
products  constitute  the  bulk  of  the  upstream flow, 
while the downstream flow  is  more varied, compris-
ing mainly finished products. 
It cannot be  inferred from  the  figures  that trade 
is  similar, and with the same breakdown, along the 
whole length of the river. From the flow  diagram it 
can  be  seen  that  German  Rhine  traffic,  i.e.  from 
Lobith to  Basle, comprises: 
- very considerable upstream transport of coal; 
- the virtual disappearance of iron-ore transport 
upstream  of  the  Ruhr;  ores  are  absorbed  at  the 
Ruhr,  while  the  downstream  shipment of Lorraine 
ores is  still very small; 
- a  gradual  slackening-off  of  trade  further  up-
stream. 
Ill. The future of the Rhine 
The  regulation  of  a  waterway  network  is  never 
finished  and  the  advantage  of  continuing  work  on 
the  Rhine  and  the  associated  waterways  has  long 
been recognised. The future changes have two  main 
purposes: - to increase the stretches with utilizable depths 
and bring the whole of the Rhine, its tributaries and 
canal  links  at least  up  to  the  European  standard 
(1,350 tons). 
- to  extend  the  Rhine  area,  i.e.  to  dig  canals 
taking  heavy  traffic  to  connect  the  river  with  the 
Rhone, the Danube and the Seine. 
However there are many obstacles to these develop-
ments: 
- the  national  differences  of  opinion  which,  in 
principle,  have  disappeared  under  the  Community 
arrangements:  but  the  main  project,  the  Rhine-
Rhone link, also concerns Switzerland, which is  not 
a member country. 
- The technical difficulties may be considered of 
secondary importance, but the link with the Danube 
still  presupposes  the  installation  of shiplifts. 
- The cost of the work is a more serious consid-
eration and the idea of toll charges is gaining ground 
(it was adopted in the case of the Moselle). 
- The  opposition  of  other  types  of  transport 
undertakings,  which  are  afraid  of  losing  some  of 
their trade. 
- The construction of oil and gas pipelines make 
this work less urgent. 
- The  towns,  especially  the  ports,  are  engaged 
in local 'wars' which slow down the progress of the 
work:  Dunkirk, for example, objected to  the canal-
ization  of  the  Moselle  and  then  asked  for  a  canal 
for heavy traffic as far as Valenciennes which, along 
with the electrified  railway  between Thionville  and 
Valenciennes,  would enable it to  keep  some  of the 
Lorraine  trade  for  itself.  Similarly,  Rotterdam  is 
opposed  to  the  construction  of  a  direct  Antwerp-
Rhine canal, which would undermine its supremacy 
and create competition. 
The Rhine-Rhone link 
As the old Rhine-Rhone canal no longer satisfies 
modem  traffic  requirements  two  alternatives  were 
considered: 
- a  Rhine-Moselle  link,  a  Moselle-Saone  canal 
and the Saone-Rhone canal. Lyons would be 1,283 km 
distant from Rotterdam by water. 
- a Rhine-Doubs canal link and a Doubs-Saone-
Rhone link. Lyons would be 1,270 km distant from 
Rotterdam by water. 
The  accepted  sheme  incorporated  the  principle 
of the two links after a common route on the Saone, 
i.e.  via the  Moselle  and the Burgundy Gap. It has 
been included in the Fifth Plan and it appears that 
it will only be put into  effect  very  slowly. 
The Rhine-Danube  link 
As  the  old  Main-Danube,  or  Ludwig  Canal,  is 
inadequate  for  present  requirements,  two  solutions 
have been suggested: 
- a Neckar-Danube link from  Stuttgart to Ulm. 
- a  Main-Danube link from  Bamberg to Ratis-
bon (Regensburg). 
The latter  solution  has  been  adopted  and  work, 
to be completed  by  1972,  is  in progress.  Ratisbon 
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is  the  present upstream  terminus  for  larger  vessels 
on the  Danube. 
The Antwerp-Rhine link 
Antwerp's  Rhine  trade  has  always  been  hand-
icapped  by  its  poor  links  with  the  Rhine  valley. 
There are two links: 
- the link via the Zealand canals, which is  long 
and dangerous because part of the canal is  used by 
large sea-going vessels. 
- the  link  via  the  Albert  and  Juliana  Canals 
which is  even more circuitous.  ' 
Antwerp has long proposed two  improvements: 
- a direct canal through the middle of Zealand, 
chosen  for  the  Delta  Plan  and  cutting  across  the 
present link  through the islands of Zealand. 
- an  extension  of the  Albert Canal to  Cologne 
or  Dusseldorf;  as  there  are  great  technical  diffi-
culties,  this  extension is  still  at  the planning stage. 
The Paris Basin-Northern France-Rhine link 
Until  recent  years  the  whole  waterway  network 
of Northern France was  noted for  its  age,  obsoles-
cence and inefficiency. Considerable changes are now 
taking place: 
- the  North-Canal,  work  on  which  was  begun 
in  1908,  was opened in  1965,  it takes vessels  of the 
European class  and  provides  a  good  link  between 
Paris  and  the  Nord  Departement via  the  Oise and 
the Somme. 
- The Valenciennes-Dunkirk canal, which forms 
a connecting link parallel with the Belgian frontier, 
is  being  converted  to  the  European  standard  and 
the work should be completed by 1970. 
A link with the Scheidt, and thence to  the Rhine 
should soon be established.  ' 
Conclusion 
The  19th  century  saw  the  creation  of  the  legal 
conditions  to  enable  Rhine  navigation  to  develop 
without being  obstructed  by frontiers;  the  principle 
of  freedom  of  navigation  on  the  Rhine  had  been 
propounded at the Congress of Vienna in  1815;  the 
Convention of Mainz in 1831  and the 1868 Conven-
tion of Mannheim had formulated  the  international 
statute of the  Rhine and set up the "Central Com-
mission for Rhine Navigation" to settle questions of 
common  interest. 
The industrial development of the Rhine regions, 
and the  advent of an economy based on commerce 
rather than self-sufficiency, gradually expanded trade 
and  justified  the  agreement  to  make  the  Rhine 
available to all. 
.  Today,  the  unification  of  Europe  is  leading  to 
mc:eased  commercial  activity,  making  it necessary 
to  Improve and extend  Rhine links  and giving  rise 
to  increasingly  dense  traffic.  Gradually,  the  many 
obstacles  which prevented the Rhine waterway net-
work  from  being  developed  harmoniously  as  a 
whole are being removed. European  Studies,  2,  1968 
The  Quest  for  European  Unity 
The history of Europe is above all a history of war.  But since the Middle Ages 
the  hope  has  existed among  thinkers  and  philosophers  that  Europe's internecine 
conflicts could be ended by creating international institutions capable of resolving 
by peaceful and lawful means  the  differences  between  nations.  It is  only in  the 
20th century,  and in particular  since  1945,  that  these  ideas  have  taken concrete 
form in the various international organisations established. 
The idea of community 
in the Middle Ages 
On Christmas  day,  800  A.  D.,  Charlemagne  was 
crowned as  emperor in Rome with the title "Augus-
tus,  Emperor  of  the  Romans".  His  asserted  suze-
rainty extended over most of the  western Christian 
world. Five centuries earlier the Papacy had claimed 
the  spiritual leadership  of  Christendom,  and in  the 
West  largely  succeeded  in  establishing  this  claim. 
Empire and Papacy together were  the  political and 
spiritual leaders of the western Christian world; and 
despite  practical  disputes  and  doctrinal  controver-
sies,  the vision  and the claim were  widely  accepted 
and reflected  in a single  civilisation of thought,  art 
and belief. 
The  Papacy  exercised  spiritual  authority  and 
jurisdiction over the property of the Church. By the 
"truce of God"  -the agreement  sanctioned by reli-
gion  to  limit  the  seasons  and  areas  of  fighting-
the  Church tried to give  practical expression to the 
ideal of a peaceful and harmonious community and to 
mitigate  some  of  the  savagery  of  feudal  warfare. 
In 1095  Pope Urban II launched the first  Crusade; 
in doing  so  he diverted  the fighting  energies  of the 
nobility  from  internecine  warfare,  and  the  western 
Christian  world  went  to  war  united  against  the 
infidel and in the name of the Church. 
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Both in theory  and practice the idea of Imperial 
unity was  weaker  than  the  idea  of  unity  expressed 
by  the  Church ;  but in  the  controversies  between 
Empire and Papacy the  apologists  of Empire made 
political claims for it parallel to the spiritual claims 
made on behalf of the Church. The attempt by the 
Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106)  to assert the divine 
authority  of  monarchy  and  to  depose  the  Pope 
failed,  and  a  compromise,  more  favourable  to  the 
Papacy  than  the  Empire,  was  reached  at  Worms 
in 1122. 
The  controversies  between  Empire  and  Papacy 
weakened  both,  culminating  for  the  Papacy  in  its 
'captivity'  at Avignon  (1309-1378)  and  the  'Great 
Schism' (1378-1417).  The ground lost was not to be 
recovered  and by  the  16th century the Papacy was 
a  protagonist  in  conflict:  large  areas  of  western 
Christendom rejected its spiritual as  well as  its tem-
poral claims in the Wars of Religion. 
The Empire too declined, partly as  a consequence 
of  internal conflict;  and,  as  it declined,  so  the two 
future  nation-states, England and France, gained in 
relative  importance.  The Hundred  Years  War  be-
tween the two  monarchies was  waged without refer-
ence to Papacy or Empire. 
It is  in this  period  that we  can discern  the  first 
attempts  to  find  alternatives  to  the decaying  papal 
and  imperial  systems  in  the  idea  of a  Community of  interest shared  by  all  of  Western  Europe.  Two 
proposals put forward  advocated the  deliberate for-
mation  of  new  institutions  for  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  to  end  the  unrestricted  warfare  of  the 
time. 
Pierre  Dubois,  a  French  lawyer,  in  about  1310 
presented to  King Philip the Fair De recuperatione 
terrae sanctae advocating the establishment of a lay 
council  (non-ecclesiastical)  with  powers  of  arbitra-
tion  in  order  to  try  to  prevent  wars  between  the 
emerging  national  states. 
King  George  Podebrady  of  Bohemia  in  1464 
accepted  the  proposal  of  Pierre  Marini  for  a 
league of states to prevent aggression, with sanctions 
on those  who  refused  arbitration.  The King  saw  in 
such  a  plan a  means  to  settle his  conflict  with  the 
papacy  and  circulated  to  the  King  of  Europe  the 
project  Congregatio  Concordiae.  Poland  and  Hun-
gary accepted the plan, which was however rejected 
by Louis XI of France. 
The emergence 
of the Sovereign  State 
The rise  of  the  nation state-as a  consolidated, 
independent,  politically  aggressive  political  unit-
in  the  16th century marked  a  decline  in  the  Euro-
pean  idea.  Yet  even  then,  in  a  different  form,  it 
survived.  Historians  have  subsequently identified  in 
the  16th century the effective  origins  of the balance 
of  power,  the  semi-conscious  groupings  of  the 
smaller  states  to  prevent  the  predominance  of  any 
of the large ones. In its way this showed an incipient 
awareness  of  a community of  interest. 
However,  from  the  16th  to  the  18th  centuries 
there  was  no  supranational  institution,  even  the 
shadow of one, which might exercise some measure 
of arbitration so as to mitigate international conflict. 
What projects  there  were  derived more  from  intel-
lectuals  than from  statesmen: 
The  French  priest  Cmce  in  1623  published  the 
Discours des occasions et moyens d' etablir une paix 
generate  et  la  liberte  du  commerce  par  tout  le 
monde.  He  proposed  a  permanent  assembly  of 
ambassadors  to  sit  in  Venice  and  was  one  of  the 
earliest  writers  to  emphasise  the  importance  of 
securing freedom of trade. 
The  De  jure  belli  et  pacis  of  Grotius,  the 
Dutch  jurist,  published  in  1625,  proposed  a  body 
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in  which  disputes  would  be  judged  by  states  not 
involved.  He  emphasised  the  need  for  the  rule  of 
law in international affairs. 
Sully's Grand Design of  1630  was  unique  among 
17th  century  schemes  in  that  it  was  advocated 
by an experienced statesman.  (The idea is  attribut-
ed  to  Henry  IV,  though  is  generally  believed 
to  be  the  work  of  his  minister  Sully.)  It proposed 
drastic  territorial  readjustments  in  order  to  create 
15  states of approximately equal strength in Europe 
directed by a council of 40 members, replaced every 
three  years  and  meeting  always  in  a  different 
town.  The  council  would  have  an  army  of  over 
100,000  men  drawn  from  all  member  states  to 
enforce its  decisions. 
The first  English  author  of  such  a  scheme  was 
William  Penn  who  in  1693,  when  in  America, 
published the Essay on the present and future peace 
of Europe by the establishment of a European Diet, 
Parliament  and  State.  Unlike  earlier  writers,  he 
proposed  that  the  voting  in  the  European  Diet 
should be weighted according to the population and 
economic  strength  of  the  members.  The  debates 
would be in Latin or French and decisions would be 
taken by a majority of 75  per cent. 
Eighteenth century writers appeared to believe that 
warfare  is  absurd  and  therefore  would  disappear 
with  the  advance  of  human  reason.  Few  of  the 
philosophes  therefore  seriously  considered  its  pre-
vention.  However,  in  1713,  the  Abbe  de  Saint-
Pierre  chose  to  publish  his  Projet  pour  rendre  la 
paix perpetuelle en Europe,  after  having  been  pre-
sent  at the  signing  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  Like 
Grotius  earlier,  the  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre  empha-
sised  the  need  for  the  rule  of  law ;  his  European 
Senate would both lay down regulation and enforce 
their  acceptance  by  force  if necessary.  Saint-Pierre 
was  criticised  by  Rousseau  because  the  initiative 
was  to  come  from  sovereigns  and  not  from  the 
people. 
Emmanuel  Kant,  in  the  Philosophical  Project 
for  Perpetual  Peace  ( 1795),  argued  that laws  must 
be  in  the  interests  of  the  people  and  proposed  a 
'federation of free peoples'. 
Jeremy  Bentham  too  laid  emphasis  on  people 
rather than kings  when  in  1798  he  wrote the Prin-
ciples  of  International  Law  (not  published  until 
1839).  He proposed an international assembly, free-
dom  of  trade and the reduction  of  armements, but 
he  did  not put forward  any  means  for  their enfor-
cement. Popular sovereignty 
and  nationalist movements 
The  French  Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic 
Empire  changed  the  context  of  political  thinking. 
The ideals  in  whose  name the Revolution  occurred 
had an international appeal. On November 19,  1792, 
the  French  Convention  declared  it  would  "accord 
fraternity and assistance to  all peoples who  wish to 
recover  their liberty".  This  revolutionary appeal  to 
the peoples of Europe made the  monarchies of the 
ancien regime realise their common interest in  their 
struggle  to  survive.  Moreover  Napoleon's  empire 
was  one  of  the  most  nearly  successful  attempts  to 
unite  Europe  by  force,  and  warfare  had  become 
more nearly total and more costly than it had been 
for centuries. 
After  1815  practical attempts were  made  to  give 
expression  to a  sense  of  common  interest  amongst 
governments, and ideal schemes continued to appear 
but in new  forms. 
Following  the  Congress  of  Vienna  the  major 
European  powers  tried  to  maintain  peace  through 
the  settlement  of  disputes  before  they  became 
serious.  However,  the  powers  themselves  were 
divided. 
The  Holy  Alliance,  comprising  initially  Russia, 
Austria  and  Prussia,  and  later  most  Continental 
monarchies,  was  a  strongly  conservative  force.  Its 
avowed  purpose was  to bind the  signatories  to  rule 
according to  the principles of the Christian religion 
and to  "remain united by the  bonds of true  frater~ 
nity,  to  lend  each  other  aid,  to  protect  Religion, 
Peace  and  Justice".  It was  largely  the  differences 
between  Britain  and  the  Continental  powers  over 
the liberal cause in Spain which led to  the collapse 
of the congress system in 1822. 
In the theoretical field,  two of the more elaborate 
nineteenth  century  schemes  were  produced  by 
Saint~Simon and Auguste Comte. 
Saint-Simon  in  1814  published  De  Ia  reorga~ 
nisation de  Ia  Societe europeenne, ou de  Ia necessite 
et des moyens de rassembler les Peuples de I'  Europe 
en  un  seul Corps  politique.  These  proposals  reflect 
at  an  international  level  the  sort  of  compromise 
which  constitutional  monarchy  provided  within  an 
individual state: he proposed that Britain and France 
should  form  the core  of  the  future  united  Europe, 
because,  he  believed,  France  had  since  the  Revo~ 
lution instituted the rule of reason and government 
3 
in the general  interest, while  English parliamentary 
institutions  represented  the  only  rational  political 
system.  The Parliament would  have two  chambers, 
one nominated by the "King of Europe" (a "political 
and scientific head" advised by a Council), the other 
elected  by  all  literate  citizens  and  representing  all 
the major interests in society. 
Auguste  Comte in  1867,  proposed  a  Republique 
occidentale  comprising  the  principal  countries  of 
western  Europe - France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain 
and  Great Britain.  The Netherlands, Belgium,  Por~ 
tugal  and Greece  would  be  associated  and perhaps 
later  also  the  USA.  He  also  suggested  a  common 
currency. 
Saint~Simon  and  Comte's  political  proposals, 
however  impracticable,  were  at  least  consistent. 
Writers  who  advocated  both  nationalism  within 
Europe and European unity faced a dilemma. Nation~ 
alism,  inevitably,  emphasised  the  uniqueness  or at 
least  the  distinctiveness  of  each  individual  nation. 
On the other hand, natiomilist movements in  differ~ 
ent  parts  of  19th~century Europe  recognised  their 
similarities of interest and aim and nationalist leaders 
projected  on  to  Europe the  same  sort  of  millenia! 
idealism  which  they  applied  to  their  own  nations. 
Giuseppe  Mazzini  founded  in  1831  the  Young 
Italy  movement,  and  in  1834  he  founded  Young 
Europe. At Paris in  1847 he said, "A day will come 
when  you,  all  the continental nations,  shall form  a 
superior  unity  without  losing  your  distinctive  qua~ 
lities  or  your  glorious  individuality  and  you  will 
constitute  the  European  brotherhood."  Later  the 
incompatibility of his  national and European ideals 
became apparent. 
Socialists  too  were conscious  of  their community 
of  interests.  The  slogan  "Workers  of  the  World 
Unite!"  and  the  very  name  of  the  'International' 
emphasised  this. 
Yet Karl Marx was never sufficiently interested in 
conflicts  between capitalist states  to  turn  his  atten~ 
tion  to  their  prevention.  To  him,  this  problem 
would vanish with the victory of the working class. 
Proudhon,  the  French  socialist  thinker,  saw 
clearly the dangers  inherent in aggressive  national-
ism,  opposed  Italian  and  German  unification,  and 
advocated  instead  - in  Du  principe  jederatif 
(1863)- a European federation based not on nation 
states  but  on  decentralised  institutions  stretching 
from  the  smallest  units  through  regional  govern~ 
ments  to  the  "federation  of  federations". 
Before  the First World  War, Socialist politicians suggested  that  the  working  class  should  refuse  to 
fight  in  a  war  they  would  regard  as  merely  a  war 
between the bourgeois classes; yet on both sides the 
workers joined up and, with the exception of a few 
British  Labour  leaders,  few  politicians  denounced 
the war or refused to fight. 
The twentieth century 
Optimism about a more rational conduct of inter-
national  affairs  appeared quite  justified  at  the  turn 
of  the  19th century.  In  1899  the first  Hague  peace 
conference  was  held,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
International Court at the  same city arose  from  its 
discussions.  A  second  Hague  conference  was  held 
in 1907 and worked towards a clarification of inter-
national law. 
But  the  disaster  of  1914-1918  shattered many of 
these  hopes.  Although the peace settlement of Ver-
sailles  (1919)  produced  the  League  of  Nations,  it 
was  at the  same time a triumph for nationalism. In 
addition to the harsh terms imposed on the defeated 
nations,  the  principle  of  self-determination  led  to 
the  creation  of  new  states  on  'national'  lines  in 
central and eastern Europe. 
However,  the  financial  and  trading  problems  of 
post-war  Europe  revealed  the  economic  interde-
pendence  of  European  states  while  the  horror  of 
war gave impetus to the vision of a European union 
which  would  prevent  such  wars  in  the  future. 
Although  it  was  a  world-wide  organisation,  the 
League  of  Nations  contained  far  more  members 
from  Europe  than  from  any  other  continent  (the 
USA  never  joined,  and  the  USSR  did  not  join 
until  1934) ;  and  the  informal  'triumvirate'  of  the 
German  Gustav  Stresemann,  the  Frenchman  Aris-
tide Briand  and the  Englishman  Austen Chamber-
lain  helped  to  regulate  international  affairs  during 
the  later twenties. 
Proposals for closer  union were  made during  the 
twenties.  In  1922  the  Austrian  Count  Couden-
bove-Kalergi  proposed  a  pan-European union  sim-
ilar  in  some  ways  to  the  USA,  and  he  founded 
the  Pan-European  Movement  to  further  the  idea. 
Seven  years  later  French  Foreign  Minister  Aris-
tide  Briand  proposed  a  European  federation  to 
the League of Nations, which formed  a study com-
mittee  for  European  union.  This  met  about  ten 
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times,  until  the  economic crisis  and Briand's death 
in  1932  brought  the  plan  to  nothing.  Nonetheless 
this  was  the  first  occasion  when  the idea  of  Euro-
pean  unity  was  considered-however  tentatively-
in the field of practical politics. 
The Second Wond War gave even greater urgency 
to  ideas  for  European  union.  By  the  end  of  it, 
Europe  was  overshadowed  by  the  USA  and  the 
USSR  and  it  seemed  to  many  that  only  a  united 
Europe could reassert its  independence.  Two  land-
marks stand out in the five  post-war years: 
Winston Churchill's appeal at Zurich in 1946 for a 
United  States  of Europe  and 
Robert Schuman's declaration of May 9,  1950, fore-
shadowing  the  creation  of  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community,  looked  towards  the  formation  of 
a united Europe not initially through political union 
but through  economic  integration.  It led  on  to  the 
creation  of  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market 
in  1958.
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The concrete steps  towards  European unity,  like 
many of their theoretical antecedents,  had  the  two-
fold  aim  of  preventing  inter-European  war  (or,  at 
times,  defending Europe against an external enemy) 
and freeing  trade  between  European countries.  Ob-
stacles  encountered  have  been  the  attachment  of 
the  individual  state  to  its  sovereignty-its  sup-
posedly untrammelled independence of action-and 
the difficulties of organising stable institutions which 
will be both eff,ective  and representative of the com· 
mon  interest  of  the  peoples  of  Europe. 
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Manpower 
•  1n  the  Common  Market 
The  working population  of the  six member states  of the  Common Market is  increasing 
only very slowly:  it rose from 72.4 million in 1958 to 74.4  million in 1966.  The trend towards 
longer  schooling  and  earlier  retirement,  and  the  fall  in  female  employment  are  the  main 
features  which explain  the very slow growth,  while in  1967  the  low level of economic activity 
was an additional influence.  The rate  of advance is distinctly  lower than  that  of the  popula-
tion as a whole, of which it amounted to 43.3 % in  1958 and 40.4 % in  1966. 
During the  period  1958-1967,  the gross  national product 
of the Community, at fixed  prices, increased by an average 
of 5.5  %  per  annum,  and productivity  in industry  and in 
the  services  sector  increased  on  average  by  4.5  %.  Italy 
was  the  only  country in which,  except for  the  years  1964 
and  1965,  productivity  approached  a  rate  of  increase  of 
6 %.  In Germany and the  Benelux  countries  productivity 
in  1966  and  in  1967  remained  below  the  annual  average 
for the period quoted.  The high  growth rate of the gross 
national  product  (56%  in  1958-1967)  as  compared  with 
Great  Britain  (33  %) and  the  United  States  (50 %)  is  not 
only to be explained in terms of technological advances and 
innovations,  it is  also  due  especially  to  better  use  of  the 
available  manpower. 
The rapid development of production  techniques  and of 
demand, the rethinking of economic organisation and data, 
and  also  the  uneven  development  of various  regions,  all 
lead  to  increasing  mobility  of labour  both  geographically 
and professionally.  It is therefore important that the labour 
market be reorganised and that the Community coordinate 
national efforts.  One of the most important social aspects 
of the work undertaken by the Community is the encourage-
ment,  in accordance  with  articles  48  and 49  of the  Rome 
Treaty, of the free movement of labour within the Common 
Market. 
Table  Working population 
Year 1966 (in thousands) 
Wage  and  Self-
Country  Working  At  work  Men  Women  salary  employed*  population  earners  %  % 
Belgium  3,703  3,684  2,455  1,148  76  24 
France  19,814  19,534  - - 74  26 
Germany  26,  76~  26,601  16,811  9,790  80  20 
Italy  19,477  18,708  13,630  5,078  62  38 
Luxembourg  140  140  - - 74  26 
Netherlands  4,480  4,435  - - 81  19 
UK  25,819  25,538  16,643  9,176  92  8 
*  Mainly family  workers in small businesses  and farms. 
(Sources:  Statistical Office  of the  European Communities;  Board of Trade.) 
Manpower and its distribution 
A. The fact  that  emerges  most clearly  is  the  continued 
decline  of  the  proportion  of  agricultural  workers  in  the 
total labour force.  This development is  closely linked with 
the  increasing  rationalisation  and  mechanisation  of  agri-
culture.  During  1958-1966,  the  number  employed  in  the 
agricultural sector fell by one quarter in Belgium, Germany, 
France and Italy.  In the Netherlands the decrease was  less 
marked  owing  to  the  high  degree  of  productivity  already 
reached in the agricultural sector. 
Italy has 24 %  of its total working population employed 
in  agriculture,  France  17.4  %,  Luxembourg  12.9 %,  Ger-
many  10.7 %,  the  Netherlands  8.7%  and  Belgium  5.6 %. 
B.  The  decline  of  the  working  population  in  the agri-
cultural  sector,  which  amounts  to  approximately  400,000 
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people per annum, is  accompanied by a  steady  drop  of the 
percentage  of non-wage  earners  in  the  total labour force. 
In  the  countries  of  the  Community  this  proportion  lies 
somewhere between 19  and 26  %. 
In Italy the proportion exceeds  38  %,  due to the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector employing to a  large extent 
family labour. 
C.  Labour  mobility  is  an  inevitable  result  of economic 
development. 
•  Some  industries  which  developed  in  the  course  of  the 
industrial  revolution  of  the  19th  century  and  which  only 
a  few  decades ago still represented the pillars  of the Com-
munity,  are  now  in  decline  (coal  and  iron)  or  are  expe-
riencing  serious  difficulty  in  adapting  to  new  conditions 
(steel, ship-building, textiles and paper). 
The  figures  of  men  employed  in  the  industries  of  the 
European Coal and Steel Community are significant in this connection.  They fell from 1,229,600 at 30 September 1966 
to  1,127,200  at 30  September  1967,  or a  fall  of 12 % for 
coalmining,  13  % for  iron-ore  mining  and  4.1  % for  the 
steel industry. 
•  Local  geographical  difficulties  must  be  cited  in  regions 
of industrial under-employment, linked with  the movement 
from  the  land.  If regional  industrialisation  is  not  based 
on a  solid infrastructure with  a  variety of industrial enter-
prises  as  well  as  service  undertakings,  the  situation  of the 
labour force  in these  areas will remain precarious. 
•  The  movement  of  labour,  more  strongly  marked  in 
arduous or disagreeable work, is towards expanding sectors, 
especially  mechanical  engineering  and  electronics,  and  the 
services, notably trade, banking and insurance. 
Mobility  brings  with  it  severe  psychological  difficulties, 
since  the very considerable  changes  occurring  in social  or 
professional status often have unfortunate results: retraining 
frequently  involves  loss  of  status,  and  the  problem  of 
qualified personnel up against the age limit has not yet been 
satisfactorily solved. 
1.  The  labour  market 
Since  1966,  the  supply  of labour has  been easier.  This 
has been especially noticeable in Germany and the Nether-
lands  where  the  previous  years  had  been  marked  by  a 
severe shortage of labour.  In Belgium and France likewise 
there has been a noticeable easing.  Luxembourg has enjoyed 
full  employment  for  a  long  time  and  there  has  merely 
been  a  lessening  of the  gap  between  demand  and  supply. 
The  slow-down  in  the  rate  of  economic  growth  expe-
rienced in  1966  in a  number of the  member states  of the 
Community,  continued  to  affect  the  labour  situation  in 
1967;  it brought increased  unemployment,  together  with  a 
falling  off in demand for labour. 
While  over  the  whole  period  1958-1967  unemployment 
fell  considerably  in  the  Community  as  a  whole  from 
2.75  million to 1.7  million, the number of unemployed rose 
from  1,440,000  in October  1966  to 1,800,000  at the end of 
1967  (an  increase  in  all  the  countries  of  the  Community 
except  for  Italy).  Besides  total  unemployment,  there  has 
also  been  an increase  in  short-time  working. 
In Germany, the economic downturn felt in the summer 
of 1966 continued during the first half of 1967  (in February 
1967, the number of unemployed reached 673,000, or 3.1  %). 
Towards  the middle  of 1967,  however,  this  trend came  to 
an end and there was a drop in the number of unemployed. 
Regional variations,  which were  accentuated  by  the  down-
turn,  persist.  The  effects  of  slowing  down  were  clearly 
seen  in  coal  mining,  but  also  in  building  and  in  manu-
facturing  industry.  On  the  other hand, there was  a  slight 
increase in employment in the various service sectors. 
In Belgium  there  has  been  a  steady  observable  increase 
in  unemployment since  the  beginning  of 1965,  accelerating 
since  the  end  of  1966.  The  monthly  average  of  insured 
workers  totally  unemployed  rose  from  55,400  in  1965  to 
85,300  in  1967.  In  January  1968,  the  number  of  un-
employed  increased  to  114,500,  or  3.07 %  of  the  working 
population.  Unemployment  increased  especially  in  the 
fields  of  mechanical  engineering,  mining  and  textiles.  As 
these  industries  are located  in  certain  regions  the  increase 
in  unemployment  shows  clear  regional  differences.  The 
percentage of total unemployment is  at present equal to the 
figure  for  1958. 
In France, the economic slow-down began in the autumn 
of  1966  and  lasted  through  the  first  half  of  1967.  As  a 
result  of  this,  the  increase  in  employment  slowed  down 
during  the first  eight months  of 1967.  From August  1967 
the trend was reversed, and the total number of unemployed 
increased.  The  situation  has  been  especially  poor  in  all 
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branches  of  activity  connected  with  private  consumer 
industries.  At the  beginning of 1968,  the government took 
steps  to revive  the economy. 
In Italy, production in  1967 rose almost as fast as in the 
preceding  year  bringing  about  a  fresh  increase  in  the 
numb:!rs  employed  in  industry.  Only  in  agriculture  was 
there  a  noticeable  fall  (2.4 %)  in  the  total  employed. 
Although  there  was  a  certain  increase  in  the  available 
working  population  in  1967,  there  was,  for  the  first  time 
since  1963,  a  substantial reduction in unemployment. 
In  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg,  labour  has  been 
in short supply for a great number of years; since there has 
been  permanent full  employment,  the  shortage  of workers 
has  necessitated  massive  recruitment  each  year  of foreign 
labour.  The noticeable slowing  down  of economic expan-
sion occurring in the Grand Duchy in 1966  led to a  falling 
off  in demand  for labour and a  relatively limited increase 
in  unemployment.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  foreign 
workers  entering  Luxembourg  was  much  lower  in  1967 
than in 1966. 
In the Netherlands, development has been similar to that 
in Germany.  Thus, for the first time since 1958, the number 
of  wage  earners  has  fallen  slightly.  For  men,  the  rate 
of unemployment  which  was  around  0.8%  in  May  1966 
rose to 2.2 % (or 61,000 unemployed) in May 1967.  At the 
end of January 1968,  the number of unemployed was some 
112,300.  The  situation  on  the  labour  market has  varied 
greatly  from  province  to  province.  In  the  province  of 
Limbourg  the  position  has  been  additionally  affected  by 
the  reduction  of  work  in  the  coal-mines  (rate  of  un-
employment= 5.4 % at the end of 1967);  and similarly in 
the  province  of  Overijsel,  where  there  are  a  great  many 
textile  concerns  (rate  of  unemployment  at  the  end  of 
1967 = 4.0 %). 
Table 2  Unfilled vacancies 
Annual average number of unfilled job vacancies 1965-1967 
Country  1965  1966  1967 
Belgium  8,500  7,500  4,400 
France  29,300  38,200  31,800 
Germany  649,000  539,800  302,000 
Italy  600  700  1,300 
Luxembourg  700  500  400 
Netherlands  129,200  114,900  68,200 
Total  817,300  701,600  408,100 
Table 3  Unemployment 
Annual average number of unemployed 1965-1967 
Number of unemployed 
Country 
1965  1966  1967 
Belgium  63,000  67,000  92,000 
France  269,000  280,000  367,000 
Germany  147,000  161,000  459,000 
Italy  721,000  769,000  609,000 
Luxembourg  0  0  0 
Netherlands  35,000  45,000  86,000 
Total  1,235,000  1,322,000  1,693,000 
UK  270,000  253,000  463,000 
(Sources:  Statistical  Office  of  the  European  Communities;  Board  of 
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life  of the  generations  born after  the  war has  contributed 
to the elasticity of the labour market.  The increased pace 
of mergers, and  tht~ restructuring  of the economy in recent 
years  has  led  to  a  rationalisation  and  a  reorganisation 
which  have  genera11y  resulted  in slowing  down  the growth 
in  demand for labour. 
At  the  same  time  there  has  been  a  movement  of  the 
self-employed  working  population  towards  paid  employ-
ment,  which  can  b~ ascribed  both to the  influx  of foreign 
workers  and  to  a  movement  from  the  agricultural  to  the 
industrial  and  service  sectors.  It should  be  noted  that 
the  opportunities  for  employment  have  increased  in  the 
service  sector relatiively  more than in industry. 
The  slowing  down  of economic  activity  is  reflected  on 
the  labour  market in  a  reduction  in  the  number  of jobs 
offered  by  employers,  by  a  reduction  of  working  hours, 
by  total  or  partial unemployment  and  by  a  falling  off  in 
the recruitment of foreign  workers.  This accounts  for the 
fact that the total !figure  for  offers  of work not met in the 
Community,  which  was  more  than  800,000  in  1965,  had 
fallen  considerably  by  1967.  At  the  same  time  un-
employment  has  increased  in  most  of  the  member  states, 
except  for  Italy,  where  there  has  been  no  recession  and 
where  the  number  of  unemployed  has  sharply  decreased 
in spite of the return of Italian workers previously employed 
abroad. 
Reservations regarding  the statistical data 
The  definition  of  unemployed  varies  from  country  to 
country  and  the  figures  are  not  therefore  in  the  strictest 
sense fully  comparable.  For example, in some but not all 
countries the figures include workers given temporary work 
by  the  employment  services.  But  they  are  sufficiently 
accurate  to  give  a  general  overall  picture  of  the  un-
employment situation in the Community. 
2.  Regulation of the market 
A.  Employment services  and occupational  training 
In all  the  countries  of the Community, the employment 
services  are  entrusted  to  specialised  bodies  in  the  public 
sector.  Their chief task consists  in ensuring  optimum use 
of available  labour.  The fact  that the  work done by the 
employment  servic1~s  in  the  six  member  states  achieves  a 
very high  standard of coordination is  without doubt ascri-
bable  to the  meetings  and recommendations  of the  Inter-
national  Labour  Office  (ILO).  There  is  everywhere  a 
growing  tendency  to  study  the  labour market more  care-
fully,  to  discover  as  soon  as  possible  any  changes  likely 
to occur in it, to forestall  unemployment through recourse 
to  selective  measu.res  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  shortage 
of  skilled  labour.  In  all  the  countries  the  balancing  of 
supply and demand for work has ceased to be regarded as 
a  quantitative  problem  and  constant  efforts  are  made  to 
improve  the  mechanisms  for  fitting  supply  to demand for 
manpower  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  better  and  better 
the social and economic requirements arising from technical 
advance  and  professional  specialisation.  If, at  first,  the 
efforts  of  the  employment  services  were  entirely  directed 
towards combatting the poverty and wretchedness  resulting 
from  unemployment,  at the  present  time  they  are mainly 
concerned on a social level with maintaining and if possible 
improving  the  standard  of  living  of  the  workers,  and  of 
developing  to  this  end  their  professional  skills  and  easing 
their  entry  to  the  job  offering  the  best  prospects.  Every-
where,  the  employment  services  are  stepping  out  of  their 
narrow  local  limitations  and  concerning  themselves  with 
balance and employment on an international scale. 
In  the  same  way,  great importance  is  now  attached  to 
the work of vocational guidance.  The employment services 
of  the  member  states  collaborate  closely  and  exchange 
information  and  experience.  Those  seeking  employment 
are  also  able  to  obtain  information  on  opportunities  for 
occupational  training  at all  levels  and  thus  improve  their 
competitive  capacity  in  the  labour  market.  We  must 
emphasize  that such  consultation,  often  followed  up  with 
financial help, is  not open only to the unemployed but also 
to  people  in  work  who  are  interested  in  professional 
advancement or a change of job. 
B.  Migration of labour 
Countries  with  a  widespread  shortage  of manpower  or 
with  local  shortages  (difficult  work  and  labouring  work) 
generally have recourse to foreign  labour. 
The  relative  importance  of  foreign  workers  lies  in  the 
percentage they form of total salaried employment.  If we 
wish  to  discover  their  real  importance,  we  must find  out 
what  part  they  have  taken  in  the  increase  of  the  total 
number  of  those  employed.  In  this  connection,  Italy 
occupies  a  special  place,  since  its  reserves  of  manpower 
contribute in great measure to the supply of labour to the 
other countries of the Community. 
Table 4 
Foreign workers as % of total working population 
Year  Belgium  Germany  I  Luxembourg I  Netherlands 
1958  0.65  0.99 
1959  0.84  0.69 
1960  1.37  0.76 
1961  5.82  2.28  21.6  0.86 
1962  5.80  1.99  2?..7  0.96 
1963  6.02  3.63  23.0  1.12 
1964  6.56  4.19  24.9  1.48 
1965  6.98  5.12  26.9  1.77 
1966  7.06  5.69  ?.7.7  2.11 
1967  7.00  4.76 
N.B.  Data  for  France  and  Italy  not  available. 
(Source:  La  libre  circulation  de  Ia  main-d'  reuvre  et  les  marches 
du  travail  dans  Ia  CEE,  1968.) 
Table  5  Number of work permits issued to new immigrants in 1967 e) 
From EEC countries 
change 
Country  Total  from  change 
1966 
Total  from  B  F  G  I  L  N  %  1966 
% 
Belgium  11,772  -19  5,957  -15  - 1,997  848  3,112  - -
France  81,866  -18  10,212  -14  429  - 1,240  8,256  15  272 
Germany  104,513  -69  49,061  -68  439  3,116  - 43,207  82  2,217 
Luxembourg  2,349  -60  2,034  -47  - 707  465  862  - -
Netherlands  14,001  -46  4,179  +17  - 1,223  1,927  1,029  - -
(1)  1st nine  months. 
(Source:  La libre  circulation  de  Ia  main-d'reuvre  et les  marches du  travail  dans  Ia  CEE,  1968.) 
3 Compared with  1966,  1967  saw  a  considerable reduction 
in the number of work permits issued, especially in Germany 
and  Luxembourg.  In  the  Netherlands,  although,  in  total, 
there  was  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  number  of 
foreign  workers,  there  was  in  1967  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  foreign  workers  coming  from  other  member 
countries  of the Community.  As  people  moving  between 
the three Benelux countries  do not require a  work permit, 
it is  not  possible  to  get  statistics  on  the  free  circulation 
between  these  countries.  As  far  as  France  is  concerned, 
it  must  be  remarked  that  the  statistics  do  not  take  into 
account  permits  issued  to  seasonal  workers  from  abroad. 
In addition, Algerian workers do not require permits.  The 
number of workers in Italy is  very low (2,527),  this  being 
essentially an country of emigration. 
A  single figure  suffices  to illustrate  the  rapid growth  of 
the number of foreign workers admitted to the Community 
during  the  period  1958-1965.  Whereas  in  1958  the  total 
number  of  permits  issued  in  the  Community  was  some 
181,500,  of which  125,800  were  issued  to  workers  coming 
from member states, the figure for 1965 is 885,670, of which 
300,175  were  issued  to  workers  from  member  states. 
Following  the  slowing  down  of  economic  activity  in  the 
Community,  the  recruH.ment  of foreign  workers  has  fallen 
considerably  since  1965.  This  reduction  has  been  even 
more marked in 1966 and 1967 (see table 5). 
Whereas  the  principal  movement  of  migrant  workers 
within  the  Community is  from  Italy  to Germany and  the 
Benelux  countries,  most  of  the  much  larger  number  of 
foreign  workers  from  outside  the  Community  are  from 
Spain  (35,000  Jan.-Sept.  1967,  mainly  to France), Portugal 
(38,000,  mainly  to  France),  Yugoslavia  (26,000,  mainly  to 
Germany), North Africa excluding  Algeria (24,000,  mainly 
to France), Turkey (17,000, mainly to Germany) and Greece 
(8,000,  mainly to Germany). 
Collaboration 
within the Community 
A.  Coordination of national statistics 
on manpower and unemployment 
One  of  the  main  tasks  of  the  Commission  is  the  har-
monization  of the statistical  methods  used  in  the  different 
countries.  As  we  have  seen  above,  the  unemployment 
documentation  and statistics  gathered in the various coun-
tries of the Community unfortunately still vary very widely. 
The  Community  needs  to  have  at  its  disposal  correlated 
statistics  for  the  whole  of its  area  in  order  to  follow  the 
development  of  employment,  given  the  economic  fluctua-
tions  and the data concerning  population, and in  order  to 
be in a  position at any moment to estimate the possibilities 
of achieving a better balance on the labour market. 
B.  Training young workers 
The Commission  of the European Communities attaches 
particular importance to occupational training.  As required 
by the Rome Treaty, the Community adopted in 1963  a set 
of  common  policy  principles.  On  this  basis  the  Com-
mission  has  drawn  up  a  general  action  progra~me and  a 
special programme for  the  agricultural sector. 
The aim is not, of course, to alter existing national struc-
tures as they have developed through the course of history. 
But it is  important that differences  should not run counter 
to the  objectives  of the Community's  programme. 
4 
C.  Retraining workers threatened 
with redundancy 
Finance is  available through the ECSC readaptation fund 
and through the EEC's European Social  Fund to improve 
employment possibilities  and to facilitate  geographical  and 
occupational  mobility  of  labour.  The  two  funds,  both 
administered by the Commission, repay 50 % of expenditure 
incurred by the member governments  on approved retrain-
ing  and  other  schemes.  The  resources  of the  funds  can 
be  ~sed  for  the  retraining  of  unemployed  workers,  the 
placmg of unemployed men in new jobs (removal expenses, 
and so .on)_,  and compensation  for  loss  of earnings  during 
mo~ermsatlon  of  plant.  The  ECSC  readaptation  fund, 
available  only  for  helping  workers  in  the  coal  and  steel 
sectors,  can  be  used  for  retraining  workers  before  un-
employment  occurs.  The  ECSC  can  also  make  available 
funds  to  attract  new  industry  into  problem  areas  and  to 
help  finance  workers'  housing  projects.  The  Commission 
has .made proposals for revising the statutes of the European 
Soctal  Fund  so  that  it  too  can  intervene  in  these  fields, 
particularly  in  industrial  redevelopment  and  in-work 
retraining. 
By the end of 1967 the ECSC readaptation fund had made 
available  $98  million  to  help  324,000  workers,  and  the 
European Social Fund $54 million to help 553,000 workers. 
The  ECSC  has  also  contributed  $104  million  towards 
industrial redevelopment projects and advanced $240 million 
(out of a  total cost of $1,023  million)  for the construction 
of 102,000 dwellings. 
D.  The free  movement of workers 
The essential element  of the  free  circulation  of workers 
which  falls  under  the  wider  head  of  the  free  circulatio~ 
of persons,  consists  of the  right  of everyone  coming from 
any  member  state  of  the  Community  to  work  on  the 
territory of any other member State (Article 1 of Regulation 
no.  38/64).  It follows  that any worker may respond to an 
offer  of work within the Community.  The free  circulation 
of workers implies that abolition of all discrimination, and 
especially  discrimination  on  grounds  of  nationality,  be-
tween  workers  of  member  states.  After  passing  through 
two  transitional  stages,  full  freedom  of movement became 
possible  on July  1,  1968,  eighteen  months  before the date 
prescribed  by  the  Treaty.  A  worker  in  any  Community 
country  can  now  accept  a  job  in  any  other  member 
country  and  must  be  given  the  necessary  permit  as  of 
right.  Once in his new country he is guaranteed equal legal 
and trade union rights.  . He may of course bring his family 
with  him.  Both  he  and  his  family  are  entitled  to  full 
social  security  rights,  and  contributions  he  pays  while  in 
his  new  country will  be credited  to him  when  he  returns 
home. 
E.  The European Investment Bank 
The European Investment  Bank  was  set  up  to  promote 
balanced  and  even  economic  development  in  all  sectors 
o~ t~e Commu11:ity.  Its prime function is to finance projects 
atmmg  to provtde fresh  employment.  Owing  to the work 
of the  Bank,  it is  possible  to  apply  economic  and  social 
measures  in  the  less  developed  regions,  especially  in  the 
sphere of the labour market.  Since its  foundation in 1958 
up  to  December  1,  1967,  the  Bank  has  signed  166  loan 
agreements for a  total sum of $865,1  million. European Studies 
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